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Abstract 
In this introduction we observe that the study of social structures and social relationships 
constitute a common theme among the articles and commentaries contained within this special 
issue on Theories of Family Enterprise. Individuals and organizations are embedded in complex 
networks of social organization and exchange. Within business enterprises, familial relationships 
engender unique goals, governance structures, resources, and outcomes. We discuss these 
relationships, potential research directions, and the contributions made by the articles and 
commentaries. In so doing, we expand the literature on how social structures and social 
relationships affect the behavior and performance of family firms.  
 




This article, and the special issue it introduces, continues a series of special issues on family 
business that began in 2003.1 In this special issue, the articles and commentaries deal with the 
social structures and social relationships that exist in family firms. Our purpose is to introduce 
that topic, identify relevant directions for future research, and review the articles and 
commentaries that follow. In this respect, we extend the contributions of previous special issues 
in this series (e.g., Steier, Chua, & Chrisman, 2009).  
Social relationships among members of an organization as well as their boundary 
spanning activities affect the resources and performance of all organizations (Eisenhardt & 
                                                 
1 This is the 15th special issue dealing with Theories of Family Enterprise. It includes the refereed articles and 
commentaries previously presented at the conference of the same name that took place on May 22-24, 2017 at the 
University of St. Gallen, Switzerland. The conference was jointly sponsored by the Swiss Research Institute of Small 
Business and Entrepreneurship and Center for Family Business, the Centre for Entrepreneurship and Family 
Enterprise at the University of Alberta, and the Center of Family Enterprise Research at Mississippi State University. 
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Schoonhoven, 1990; Penrose, 1959; Uzzi, 1997). The influence of social relationships on family 
firms is likely to be different, however, because of the controlling family’s structural, cognitive, 
and relational embeddedness in the firm (Bird & Zellweger, 2018). For example, relationships 
within family firms typically differ from those of nonfamily firms in terms of conditions of 
membership, communication principles, norms of justice, and time horizons (Zellweger, 2017). 
The embeddedness and the legitimacy and power that the family may exercise as a result of the 
property rights secured through controlling ownership allows the family to pursue family-oriented 
non-financial goals that generate socioemotional wealth (SEW), which are rarely present and 
would be considered illegitimate in nonfamily firms.  
These social relationships may be categorized as: (1) intra-family relationships that exist 
among family members; (2) extra-family relationships that exist between family members not 
directly involved in the family firm and nonfamily individuals and groups; (3) intra-firm 
relationships that exist among family and nonfamily members of the firm; (4) and extra-firm 
relationships that exist between the firm or its members (family or nonfamily) and external 
stakeholders. In the typical family firm, these relationships will interact with each other. For 
example, sibling rivalry within the family can affect relationships between family and nonfamily 
workers in the firm. Likewise, a non-involved family member’s relationship with someone 
outside the family and the firm may lead to an expansion of the firm’s network (cf., Steier, 2007). 
Globally, these behaviors are further influenced by contextual factors such as the formal or 
informal institutions in a region or nation (Steier, 2009). In other words, while social 
relationships matter, so does the social structure within which they are embedded (Burt, 1992; 
Granovetter, 1985).  
In turn, a family firm’s pursuance of financial and non-financial goals requires ability –
both in terms of the decision-making control and the resources needed to act – and the 
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willingness to use that ability to behave in a particularistic fashion (Carney, 2005; Chrisman, 
Sharma, Steier, & Chua, 2013; De Massis, Kotlar, Chua, & Chrisman, 2014). Social relationships 
can enhance ability by strengthening the capacity of a family firm’s dominant coalition to govern 
and by providing access to valuable resources (Pearson, Carr, & Shaw, 2008). Social 
relationships may also affect the willingness of the dominant family coalition to pursue 
particularistic financial and non-financial goals.  
The model in Figure 1 depicts the effects of family embeddedness and social relationships 
on a family firm. As the model shows, the family’s structural, cognitive, and relational 
embeddedness affects the four interactive categories of social relationships. These social 
relationships help the family maintain decision-making control of the firm and develop both 
family- and firm-level resources, which interact with one another (as shown by the double-headed 
arrow). Social relationships also influence the willingness for particularistic behavior. Together, 
ability and willingness influence the achievement of financial and non-financial goals. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
Potential Research Directions 
Researchers have explored in quite some detail the structural embeddedness of firms, such as the 
size, openness, centrality, and spatial distribution of their networks (e.g., Bruderl & Preisendorfer, 
1998; Jack & Anderson, 2002; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). This research has explored how social 
networks (Batjargal, 2010; Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004; Stam & Elfring, 2008) and 
inter-organizational alliances (Davidsson, Achtenhagen, & Naldi, 2010; Stuart, 2000) contribute 
to firm performance. Furthermore, Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, and Very (2007) discuss how family 
social capital is formed and spills over to form organizational social capital and Chua, Chrisman, 
Kellermanns, and Wu (2011) study situations where family firms borrow family social capital. 
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Nevertheless, we still do not know much about how relational embeddedness – the quality of the 
relationships between members of a group, in terms of levels of trust, identification, and mutual 
obligations (Blatt, 2009; Moran, 2005) – impact economic action and success (Bird & Zellweger, 
2018). The dearth of research is perceptible not only among members of top management teams 
(TMTs), but also between TMTs and other stakeholders, both inside and outside family firms.  
Keeping in mind the complexities associated with family and nonfamily relationships 
inside family firms, these deliberations about structural and relational embeddedness suggest that 
the time is ripe to revisit what we mean when we say that a family is embedded in the firm 
because family embeddedness so far has been studied primarily in the context of newly founded 
firms (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003). This line of research suggests that an entrepreneur’s embeddedness 
in a family can facilitate the startup process by providing resources and emotional support (e.g., 
Chua et al., 2011). Alternatively, family relationships may undermine entrepreneurial intentions 
and activities (Kellermanns, Eddleston, & Zellweger, 2012). For example, family ties primarily 
generate bonding social capital rather than bridging social capital and consequently hold only a 
limited amount of novel information. This may depress innovativeness (Ruef, 2002, 2010). In 
certain cases network closure may inhibit the ability of family firms to capitalize on the strength 
of weak ties available in the broader social system (Granovetter, 1973). Furthermore, financial 
and non‐financial obligations embedded in familial relationships can have negative performance 
implications and threaten the family system (Arregle et al., 2015; Sieger & Minola, 2017). 
However, as is well-known, families can be embedded in established firms as well. A goal 
of this special issue is thus to revisit and unpack the concept of family embeddedness in terms of 
social structures and social relationships (Bird & Zellweger, 2018; Jennings, Eddleston, Jennings, 
& Sarathy, 2015; Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Lester, 2011). In combination with the insights 
gained from the articles and commentaries in this issue, we see family embeddedness in terms of 
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a firm’s exposure to familial relationships that either support or constrain the firm’s development. 
With this definition, we draw attention to features that seem decisive for a more in-depth 
understanding of family embeddedness in business activity.  
Foremost, we need to expand our understanding of family embeddedness beyond the 
founding context to the entire lifecycle of the firm (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). In the founding 
context, the family may be a critical resource contributor to an entrepreneurial venture even if 
other family members are not directly involved (Steier, 2007). In contrast, in established firms the 
resource flows between family and business may change direction over time so that the family 
may become a net recipient of resources from the firm (cf., Sharma, 2008). In fact, this is the 
dominant concern of the well-developed principal-principal agency literature. 
It also seems important to take into account the life course of key decision makers, which 
shape their views and behaviors (Aldrich & Kim, 2007; Elder, Johnson, & Crosnoe, 2003). As 
part of a family embeddedness perspective, critical life course events come in the form of the 
birth of children, marriage, divorce, or death, to mention just a few decisive life course events. At 
this point, we can only speculate about the ways in which these events spill over onto a firm, such 
as when they alter owners’ risk aversion, dividend demands, propensity to engage in mergers and 
acquisitions, and eventually even decisions for a firm’s sale or closure. 
Moreover, we have to be more specific about whether we speak about the structural, 
cognitive, or relational embeddedness of decision makers and firms (Dacin, Beal, & Ventresca, 
1999; Leana & Van Buren, 1999; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Pearson et al., 2008; Tsai & 
Ghoshal, 1998). For instance, it appears important to move beyond a monolithic view of family to 
take into account structural, relational and cognitive embeddedness differences among various 
types of families and their firms (Bird & Zellweger, 2018; Parsons, 1949; Zellweger, 2017). In 
fact, the need to differentiate the types of families in control of a firm is well-known in the family 
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business literature, which tends to distinguish between owner-manager, sibling partnership, and 
cousin consortium constellations (Gersick, Lansberg, Desjardins, & Dunn, 1999). Exploring the 
structural, cognitive, and relational embeddedness of different types of family firms holds wide 
theoretical and practical promise. 
Moving beyond the mere presence or absence of certain types of social relationships, 
researchers and practitioners alike would benefit tremendously from further insights into how 
family firms manage these relationships. The formation of social capital in family firms have 
been explored at the conceptual level (e.g., Arregle et al., 2007; Pearson et al., 2008). However, 
we lack adequate insights into how social relationships with stakeholders such as employees and 
clients, are maintained by family firms across time and even generations. We also know relatively 
little about the stability of these relationships, and what types of behaviors support or undermine 
them. In this regard, family business researchers have started to build upon the transaction cost 
economics literature to better understand problems of asset specificity, holdup, bounded 
rationality, and bounded reliability, which may drive a wedge between family and nonfamily 
members of an organization (Chrisman et al., 2014; Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; Verbeke & 
Greidanus, 2009; Verbeke & Kano, 2012). In light of the importance of nonfinancial goals for 
family firms (Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012; Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, 
Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Zellweger, Nason, Nordqvist, & Brush, 2013), we also need 
studies that investigate how goals influence the development and maintenance of relationships, 
and through what processes family firms generate and appropriate the economic and 
noneconomic value that is tied to these relationships. In sum, we call for further research on the 
formation, maintenance, stability, and instrumentality of social relationships in family firms. 
Any in-depth discussion of family embeddedness will have to deal with cross-level and 
multi-level phenomena (Rousseau, 1985), in particular, individuals, families, and firms. The 
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interactions among these levels are intricate since they exist along various governance domains, 
such as ownership, the board of directors, and the TMT. In working towards unpacking cross-
level and multi-level effects of family and business it seems promising to build on the rich work 
in the human resource literature that deals with such effects (e.g., Glisson & James, 2002; 
Takeuchi, Chen, & Lepak, 2009).  
Finally, work on family embeddedness needs to take into account the linkages between 
the family and firm on the one hand, and the broader societal context in which the firm is 
embedded on the other. This discussion will have to move beyond observations about whether 
families are good at navigating environments with weak market and legal institutions (Banalieva, 
Eddleston, & Zellweger, 2015; Khanna & Palepu, 2000), or whether family firms fill or exploit 
institutional voids (Luo & Chung, 2013). For instance, family membership and who is a 
legitimate claimant to a firm’s assets has been found to vary greatly depending on societal context 
(Khavul, Bruton, & Wood, 2009; Smith, 2009). Furthermore, we know relatively little about the 
impact of laws and regulations on the transgenerational preservation of family assets (Carney, 
Gedajlovic, & Strike, 2014; Ellul, Pagano, & Panunzi, 2010).  
Contributions of the Articles and Commentaries 
The articles and commentaries in this special issue contribute towards an understanding of social 
relationships in family firms in multiple ways. We group them according to whether they explore 
(1) intra-family social relationships, (2) intra-firm social relationships, or (3) extra-firm social 
relationships. Unfortunately, none of the studies in the special issue investigate extra-family 
social relationships, which suggests an avenue that future research needs to explore. 
Intra-Family Social Relationships 
The article by Garcia, Sharma, De Massis, Wright, and Scholes (2019, this issue) 
explores how parental support and psychological control alter the self-efficacy and commitment 
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of next-generation family members. Garcia et al. argue that parental support (i.e., instrumental 
assistance, career-related modeling, verbal encouragement, and emotional support) has a positive 
effect on perceived self-efficacy and both the affective and normative commitment of next-
generation family members to engage in a family firm. In contrast, psychological control (i.e., 
excessive control, manipulation, and constraining interactions by a domineering parent) weakens 
next-generation family members’ self-efficacy and affective commitment while strengthening 
their normative and continuance commitment. As such, their article complements prior work by 
McMullen and Warnick (2015) who explain how parent‐founders can promote affective 
commitment in successors and that of Parker (2016) who proposes that investment in intangible 
capital and high parental effort can help solve the willing successor problem.  
In her commentary, Reay (2019, this issue) further unpacks the black box of within-
family relationships and draws attention to family routines, such as family celebrations, family 
traditions, and family interactions, which she sees as mechanisms through which norms, values 
and beliefs are communicated between generations. Such family routines have been found to 
foster identity and increase support among group members, which may be particularly valuable in 
times of crisis. Building on recent advancements in the routines literature (Howard-Grenville & 
Rerup, 2016) and by pointing to the family therapy literature, Reay assigns important roles to 
agency, change, and intervention, thereby moving the discussion of parenting styles in the context 
of family business succession from a static and passive perspective towards a more dynamic and 
active perspective.  
In conjunction with prior literature, the work of Garcia and colleagues (2019) and Reay 
(2019) suggest multiple avenues for future research. For instance, researchers could test the 
impact of instrumental assistance, career-related modeling, verbal encouragement, and emotional 
support on the commitment of next generation family members (Turner & Lapan, 2002). 
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Furthermore, while the supportive and altruistic role of parents is discussed in many studies of 
family firms (e.g., Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001; 
Zellweger, Richards, Sieger, & Patel, 2016), the constraining, domineering, and even 
manipulative behavior of parents has received less attention (e.g., Criaco, Sieger, Wennberg, 
Chirico, & Minola, 2017). The article by Garcia and colleagues and the commentary by Reay 
thus represent important work on which future researchers can build to explore both the bright 
and dark sides of family relationships (Kellermanns et al., 2012). There is a particular opportunity 
to study problematic behaviors that sometimes occur during family business succession and the 
strategies that might reduce their chance of occurrence (cf., Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2018). 
The flip side of problematic parental behavior is the reactions of the next generation, which may 
include social comparisons, feelings of inferiority and entrapment, perceived restrictions to 
autonomy, etc. (Criaco et al., 2017; Sieger & Minola, 2017). These reactions may vary in 
different kinds of families. For example, in tightly knit families, parents’ supportive or 
controlling behaviors could have outsized positive or negative effects. 
The above studies primarily focus on how support can foster commitment and willingness 
to join a family firm. However, neither parental support nor an offspring’s willingness necessarily 
reflects his/her managerial capability, which is often lower than that of professional CEOs, who 
are selected from among the very best of a much larger talent pool (Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-
Gonzalez, & Wolfenzon, 2007; Perez-Gonzalez, 2006). Therefore, the relationship between the 
willingness and capability to lead a family firm deserves more scrutiny, as does how parents and 
other family owner-managers can develop the latter along with the former. Just as the 
motivational triggers underlying willingness and commitment may differ substantially (Sharma & 
Irving, 2005), capability is somewhat context specific and has both innate and developmental 
components that need to be better understood.  
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Intra-Firm Social Relationships  
A second stream of articles deal with social relationships within family firms. Kotlar and 
Sieger (2019, this issue) explore the entrepreneurial behavior of family and nonfamily managers. 
Kotlar and Sieger draw from transaction cost economics to argue that in comparison to family 
managers, nonfamily managers face greater bounded rationality problems in terms of 
understanding the goals, strategic alternatives, and entrepreneurial opportunities of family firms. 
They further suggest that nonfamily managers are more likely to reduce their commitment to the 
family firm over time, creating a bounded reliability problem. Both of these problems are 
expected to limit the entrepreneurial behavior of nonfamily managers in family firms. Indeed, in 
their study of 296 family firms, Kotlar and Sieger find that nonfamily managers exhibit lower 
levels of entrepreneurial behavior than family managers. However, the entrepreneurial behavior 
of nonfamily managers is higher when a founder is involved in the firm. 
Looking at the mechanisms for increasing the entrepreneurial behavior of nonfamily 
managers, Kotlar and Sieger (2019) find monitoring, distributive justice, participation in the 
TMT, and perceived control to be effective. These findings cast further doubt on the predictions 
of stewardship theory, which predicts that the interests of owners and managers should naturally 
align. In fact, Kotlar and Sieger find that managerial controls are necessary since owners cannot 
count on managers to automatically defer to owners on the goals of the company, especially in 
family firms that pursue nonfinancial as well as financial goals.  
Interestingly, though, Kotlar and Sieger find that some of the classical agency-based 
remedies for managerial opportunism such as shareholding and performance-based pay are 
unable to increase the entrepreneurial behavior of nonfamily managers. The non-finding for 
shareholding perhaps conceals a more fundamental problem about the actual control that the 
family is willing to cede. For example, little incentive is likely to be provided if a nonfamily 
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manager is given a minority share in the firm only to realize that while he is indeed an owner on 
paper, his actual influence and remuneration remains low. Such problems may be especially 
severe in family firms that pay out very low dividends and pursue nonfinancial as well as 
financial goals (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011; Neckebrouck, Schulze, & Zellweger, 2018). 
Similarly, the non-finding for performance-based pay may be an indication that such practices are 
more show than substance in many family firms, that the incentives offered are simply not 
sufficient to elicit more effort, or the system is not sensitive enough to the performance of the 
individual manager (Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009). All in all, a major conclusion from 
Kotlar and Sieger’s study is that the assumptions of both agency and stewardship theory 
regarding the types and use of governance mechanisms may need to be revisited and reconciled in 
light of the problems of bounded rationality and bounded reliability.  
In their commentary, Soleimanof, Singh and Holt (2019, this issue) switch the focus to 
the family to explore how family institutions, such as family structures, parenting styles, and 
communication patterns impact the entrepreneurial attitudes and mindsets of family members. 
They suggest that family institutions shape family members’ cognitions as well as their 
interactions and relationships. For example, Soleimanof et al. argue that rigid family structures, 
authoritarian parenting styles, and conformity in communication patterns tend to stifle 
entrepreneurial behaviors whereas greater flexibility in these dimensions can enhance 
entrepreneurial behaviors. They also note that cultures, particularly those based on hierarchical 
authority, collectivism, and ethnicity can have a major role in shaping family institutions. Thus, 
Soleimanof et al.’s commentary complements the article by Kotlar and Sieger, as well as that of 
Garcia et al., 2019, and suggests that research on how family institutions and culture influence the 
entrepreneurial behavior of both family members and nonfamily members would be useful. 
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The second article on relationships within family firms by Cruz, Justo, Larraza-
Kintana and Garces-Galdeano (2019, this issue) explores how female members of boards of 
directors impact family firms’ corporate social performance (CSP). They suggest that while 
female directors are more likely to favor actions that enhance CSP, not all have the power and/or 
perceived legitimacy to influence board decision making. Probing a sample of Fortune 1000 firms 
over the period from 2008 to 2012, Cruz et al. find that increases in CSP associated with women 
on the boards of family firms are due mainly to the presence of two types of women directors: (1) 
nonfamily, outside directors, and (2) family inside directors. However, family outsiders, women 
directors who are family members but do not work in the firm, and nonfamily insiders, women 
directors who work in the firm but are not part of the family, do not seem to influence CSP. 
The article by Cruz et al. (2019) raises some interesting questions. Conceptually, the 
article draws attention to role identities and gender stereotypes in family firms, a topic that has 
received increasing, but still insufficient attention (e.g., Amore, Garofalo, & Minichilli, 2014; 
Martinez-Jimenez, 2009; Rodríguez-Ariza, Cuadrado-Ballesteros, Martínez-Ferrero, & García-
Sánchez, 2017). Since only 13.6% of the board members of the companies Cruz et al. studied are 
females, and only about 1/6 of these are female family members, women are obviously 
underrepresented. However, regarding their influence on board decisions, it is possible that some 
female directors may not be advocates for CSP or may have simply been outvoted rather than 
marginalized. It is also likely that some female board members share the mindsets of their male 
counterparts (for or against CSP), while others have different perspectives. Thus, a direct 
comparison with male directors is needed to fully understand the influence and status of female 
directors. Such a comparison would need to account for variations in family and firm status, as 
well as the perceptions of board members on issues such as CSP. In sum, the article by Cruz et al. 
indicates the need for more research into the micro-processes in family firm boardrooms. 
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Moreover, it seems highly topical as the possibility of “primageniture” (the appointment of a first 
born daughter as successor) rather than “primogeniture” increases. 
In the third article dealing with social relationships within family firms, McLarty, 
Vardaman and Barnett (2019, this issue) argue that pursuit of family and firm-related goals in 
family firms creates dissonance for employees about how to channel their efforts on behalf of the 
organization. Drawing on social exchange theory, they propose that congruence between 
supervisors’ familial status and the importance they place on SEW aids in resolving this 
dissonance and signals to employees that the supervisor is a genuine and trustworthy exchange 
partner. McLarty et al. suggest that congruence also removes uncertainty about where to direct 
effort by signaling what activities are valued, allowing committed employees to achieve higher 
task and citizenship performance. In contrast, supervisors with incongruent behavior may be seen 
as obsequious and weak, thereby creating confusion among employees about how they should 
prioritize their efforts.  
The empirical findings by McLarty et al. (2019) support their theoretical arguments and 
have direct practical relevance, pointing to an understudied aspect of leadership in family firms. 
The consistency between the status and the goals of a supervisor seems to help turn high 
commitment into high task and citizenship performance. Thus, firm leaders need to be aware of 
the importance of behaving predictably and reliably: a certain role identity (e.g., family versus 
nonfamily status) creates expectations about goal priorities (e.g., emphasis on SEW versus 
financial performance). Congruence has a supportive effect for employees with high levels of 
commitment who seem to appreciate guidance from a leader they perceive as legitimate, whether 
that leader is a member of the owning family or not. 
On the other hand, incongruence may not be a problem for those employees who are less 
committed. In fact, an intriguing and apparently unanticipated insight of their study is that when 
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supervisors behave inconsistently (family supervisors with low SEW concerns, or, nonfamily 
supervisors with high SEW concerns), employees with low commitment reach higher levels of 
task performance, higher even than employees with high commitment when supervisors display 
consistent behavior. These findings suggest that commitment per se is no guarantee of the highest 
levels of task performance. Taken to the extreme, highly committed employees may also be those 
that are less competent and require the guidance of a legitimate leader to reach high levels of task 
performance. However, as is the case for the Garcia et al. (2019) article, the article by McLarty et 
al. (2019) does not take individual capabilities into account. In family firms, employees with 
lower commitment may be those with higher capabilities who are only there until more promising 
job prospects in nonfamily firms come along. But if such employees see supervisor incongruity 
as a sign of weak or ineffectual leadership they may perceive an opportunity for their own 
advancement and increase their efforts. In any event, future studies should more closely scrutinize 
the (managerial, technological, general) capabilities of family and nonfamily employees in family 
firms as well as their commitment (cf., Chrisman, Devaraj, & Patel, 2017).  
In their commentary, Campopiano and Rondi (2019, this issue) take the idea of 
incongruence one step further and suggest that in line with leader-follower congruence 
arguments, employee commitment is also influenced by hierarchical dyadic congruence (Zhang, 
Wang, & Shi, 2012). Hierarchical dyadic congruence exists when the supervisor and the 
supervisee both have the same familial status and SEW concerns. Campopiano and Rondi argue 
that while hierarchical dyadic congruence always strengthens the supervisee commitment-
performance relationship, hierarchical dyadic incongruence does not always weaken the 
supervisee commitment-performance relationship. Taken together, the article by McLarty et al. 
(2019) and the commentary by Campopiano and Rondi add to knowledge on micro organizational 
behaviors in family firms (Gagné, Sharma, & De Massis, 2014). 
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Extra-Firm Social Relationships  
The final set of articles investigates the intersection of societal contexts and family 
firms. Mani and Durand (2019, this issue) take a refreshing look at the business group 
affiliation of family firms. They find that family firms in India are less likely to be part of 
business groups, to exhibit cross group ties, and to be embedded in intercorporate ownership 
networks, findings that seem to be in conflict with institutional void arguments (Luo & Chung, 
2013). On the other hand, Mani and Durand find that firms with greater involvement in trading 
communities are more likely to be part of business groups, to exhibit cross group ties, and to be 
embedded in intercorporate ownership networks. These trading communities are distinguished by 
commonalities among members in terms of characteristics such as religion, language, region, and 
caste. Thus, they are roughly analogous to ethnic groups; but their shared characteristics also 
make them similar to family firms, when family is defined very broadly.  
Indeed, prior work is suggestive of the similarities between community enterprises and 
family firms in that there is a relational component that can be more important than merit in their 
governance systems (Peredo & Chrisman, 2006). The fact that trading communities such as these 
seem to possess characteristics that one might normally associate with family firms suggests that 
they deserve more research attention. Indeed, it would be useful to understand the extent to which 
social relationships and other characteristics of trading communities or community enterprises are 
similar or different from family firms, business families (Steier, Chrisman, & Chua, 2015), 
multifamily firms (Pieper, Smith, Kudlats, & Astrachan, 2015), and business groups (Morck & 
Yeung, 2003) and how those differences are shaped by institutional contexts (Steier, 2009).  
The commentary by Hsueh and Gomez-Solorzano (2019, this issue) adds further value 
by discussing heterogeneity in the social ties of family firm and community leaders. As those 
authors suggest, besides varying in strength, ties can: (1) be neutral or negative as well as 
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positive; (2) be based on affective or instrumental logics; (3) have symmetric or asymmetric 
content for the parties in the relationship; and (4) change their characteristics over time. Hsueh 
and Gomez-Solorzano point out that each of these characteristics can influence the network 
strategies selected by individuals or firms. Likewise, these network strategies can vary in their 
efficiency and effectiveness depending on the characteristics of the ties on which they are based. 
Given the importance of social relationships and social capital to family firms (Arregle et al., 
2007; Pearson et al., 2008), Hsueh and Gomez-Solorzano provide useful insights on how the 
strong and weak ties of family firms can be conceptualized and measured. One particularly 
interesting research question derived from their work is how the addition or deletion of ties with 
different characteristics might affect family firms. With regard to addition of ties, the list of 
circumstances would include events such as marriage, adoption, and the inclusion of nonfamily 
members in the TMT or ownership group. Mehrotra, Morck, Shim, and Wiwattanakantang’s 
(2013) study of arranged marriages might be an instructive starting point for such an 
investigation.  
In the second article in this group, Baù, Chirico, Pittino, Backman and Klaesson 
(2019, this issue) explore the structural embeddedness of family firms in rural and urban contexts 
using a matched sample of 7,829 family firms and 7,829 nonfamily firms in Sweden. They 
hypothesize that family firms will grow slower than nonfamily firms but local embeddedness, 
especially in rural areas, will have a larger positive impact on family firm growth than nonfamily 
firm growth. However, family firms are found to grow faster than nonfamily firms in general, a 
finding that is unexpected, particularly given prior research (e.g., Bird & Zellweger, 2018). 
Nevertheless, their study confirms that family firms benefit most from local embeddedness and 
that the impact of local embeddedness on family firm growth is greatest in rural settings. The 
authors suggest that the reason for these findings is that the dual financial and nonfinancial goals 
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of family firms provide them with incentives to cultivate their embeddedness in the local 
community, making them more likely to use social capital as an integral part of their strategy. 
Interestingly, local embeddedness may decrease the growth of nonfamily firms. Baù et 
al. (2019) attribute this to potentially lower quality, antagonistic relationships that some 
nonfamily firms develop in the community. However, since they do not measure the quality of 
the extra-firm social relationships of family or nonfamily firms directly, more work on the 
positive and negative aspects of local embeddedness is needed. Similarly, work on how family 
firms recognize, build, and exploit relationships in their communities, and which relationships are 
key to growth, profitability, and SEW would be especially useful.  
Finally, Lude and Prügl (2019, this issue) investigate how 418 nonprofessional 
investors perceive family firms using an experimental study based on the precepts of prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Lude and Prügl find that owing to a reputation for 
trustworthiness and longevity, family firms are able to benefit from a cognitive embeddedness 
advantage among investors, which the authors label “family firm bias.” Here, we should note that 
reputation is similar to social capital in that it based on prior dealings that enables a firm to have 
access to certain resources that are necessary for it to achieve its objectives (cf., Luoma-aho, 
2013). Furthermore, like social capital, if handled properly, reputation grows stronger with use. 
Lude and Prügl (2019) find that nonprofessional investors disproportionately prefer to 
invest in family firms in comparison to nonfamily firms, even when the former represent riskier 
investments. This finding holds regardless of whether investors operate in the domain of gains or 
losses. Indeed, the effect is most pronounced in the gain context where investors are presumed to 
be more risk averse. Interestingly, results indicate that the family firm investment option does not 
affect risk awareness of nonprofessional investors, only their willingness to assume risk.  
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Of particular importance is Lude and Prügl’s effort to investigate the editing process 
where investors evaluate the information at their disposal for subsequent decision making, as this 
is a first step toward determining cause and effect relationships. They find that trust and longevity 
underlie the family firm bias that lead individuals to prefer risky family firm investments over 
less risky, nonfamily ones. Unexpectedly, family firms’ reputation for longevity trumps trust as a 
cognitive motivator. This is notable as it suggests that the practical and well as theoretical utility 
of the transgenerational sustainability goal associated with family firms has not been fully 
appreciated in the literature (cf., Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999; Zellweger, Kellermanns, 
Chrisman, & Chua, 2012). Put differently, the implication that the transgenerational sustainability 
of family firms is a resource that has value to external stakeholders as well as family 
stakeholders, suggests a promising new line of research. Additionally, their experimental 
approach might be usefully applied to confirming or denying the idea that SEW leads to risk 
aversion in the gains domain and risk seeking in the loss domain (Chrisman & Patel, 2012), as 
well as to sorting out the influence of its components (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). 
In their commentary, Fang, Siau, Memili, and Dou (2019, this issue) discuss four 
cognitive factors in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) that may also create bias in 
assessing risky decisions and might also help explain some of the underlying mechanisms 
associated with the family firm bias of investors identified by Lude and Prügl (2019). These 
include anchoring (a mental starting point), representativeness (assessment based on the 
similarity of a situation with other situations), stereotype heuristic (assessment based on 
prevailing or socially dominant beliefs), and information availability (assessment based on partial 
information). To our knowledge, no one has applied these to a family business setting even 
though they may yield useful insights, separately, and in combination. Furthermore, aside from 
helping to understand risky decisions, these cognitive factors might also help to understand social 
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relationships in family firms, particularly those involving new participants such as nonfamily 
managers and in-laws.  
Conclusion 
In this introductory article we argue that it important to further understand how family firm 
behavior is affected by social structures and social relationships emanating from a family’s 
embeddedness in a firm. We also describe how the articles and commentaries in this special issue 
contribute to this understanding. Significantly, we identify four categories of social relationships: 
intra-family, intra-firm, extra-family, and extra-firm. Unfortunately extra-family relationships are 
not represented among the studies in this special issue, which may indicate that it is ripe for 
investigation. However, the other categories are well-represented. 
We argue that future research endeavors would benefit from taking into account the whole 
lifecycle of the firm, life course events of key decision makers, and the structural, cognitive, and 
relational embeddedness of decision makers and firms. We also call for further empirical work on 
the formation, maintenance, stability, and instrumentality of social relationships in a family firm 
context, and advocate closer attention to cross-level and multi-level phenomena, in particular 
between the family and firm levels.  
Overall, there are many opportunities for research on the societal and institutional 
contexts in which firms are embedded, taking into particular account cognitive and regulatory 
institutions that impact family firm behavior. The articles and commentaries in this special issue, 
combined with work on family sociology (Jaskiewicz, Combs, Shanine, & Kacmar, 2017), 
economic sociology (Dacin et al., 1999; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Uzzi, 1997), and 




Appendix: Reviewers for the Special Issue 
We are grateful to the following individuals for sharing their time and expertise to help develop 
this special issue of Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice on Theories of Family Enterprise by 
reviewing the articles and commentaries submitted. 
Tim Blumentritt, Kennesaw State University 
Isabel Botero, Stetson University 
Gabriella Cacciotti, University of Warwick (United Kingdom) 
Erick Chang, Arkansas State University 
Danielle Cooper, University of North Texas 
Josh Daspit, Texas State University 
Alexandria Dawson, Concordia University (Canada) 
Bart Debicki, Towson University 
Federico Frattini, Polytecnico di Milano (Italy) 
Rich Gentry, University of Mississippi 
Danny Holt, Mississippi State University 
Liena Kano, University of Calgary 
Ambra Mazzelli, Asia School of Business (Malaysia) 
Aaron McKenny, University of Central Florida 
Onnolee Nordstrom, North Dakota State University 
Pankaj Patel, Villanova University 
Whitney Peake, Western Kentucky University 
Torsten Pieper, University of North Carolina, Charlotte 
Kirk Ring, Louisiana Tech University 
Matthew Rutherford, Oklahoma State University 
Savatore Sciascia, IULM University (Italy) 



































   Resources  
      




            - trust 
           - identification 






       - obligations  Intra- & Extra- Firm  Resources  
      
      
    WILLINGNESS 
(Goals) 
 
      






Aldrich, H. E., & Cliff, J. E. (2003). The pervasive effects of family on entrepreneurship: toward 
a family embeddedness perspective. Journal of Business Venturing, 18(5), 573-596. 
Aldrich, H.E., & Kim, P.H. (2007), A life course perspective on occupational inheritance: 
Self-employed parents and their children. In Ruef, M. & Lounsbury, M. (Ed.) The 
sociology of entrepreneurship (Research in the sociology of organizations, Volume 
25, pp. 33-82). Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
Amore, M. D., Garofalo, O., & Minichilli, A. (2014). Gender interactions within the family firm. 
Management Science, 60(5), 1083-1097. 
Arregle, J.-L., Hitt, M. A., Sirmon, D. G., & Very, P. (2007). The development of organizational 
social capital: Attributes of family firms. Journal of Management Studies, 44(1), 73-95. 
Arregle, J. L., Batjargal, B., Hitt, M. A., Webb, J. W., Miller, T., & Tsui, A. S. (2015). Family 
ties in entrepreneurs’ social networks and new venture growth. Entrepreneurship Theory 
and Practice, 39(2), 313-344. 
Banalieva, E. R., Eddleston, K. A., & Zellweger, T. M. (2015). When do family firms have an 
advantage in transitioning economies? Toward a dynamic institution‐based view. 
Strategic Management Journal, 36(9), 1358-1377. 
Batjargal, B. (2010). The effects of network's structural holes: polycentric institutions, product 
portfolio, and new venture growth in China and Russia. Strategic Entrepreneurship 
Journal, 4(2), 146-163. 
Baù, M., Chirico, F., Pittino, D., Backman, M., & Klaesson, J. (2019, this issue). Roots to grow: 
Family firms and local embeddedness in rural and urban contexts. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice. 
Bennedsen, M., Nielsen, K. M., Perez-Gonzalez, F., & Wolfenzon, D. (2007). Inside the family 
firm: The role of families in succession decisions and performance. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, May: 647-691. 
Berrone, P., Cruz, C. C., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2012). Socioemotional wealth in family firms: 
Theoretical dimensions, assessment approaches, and agenda for future research. Family 
Business Review, 25(3), 258-279. 
Bird, M., & Zellweger, T. (2018). Relational embeddedness and firm growth: Comparing spousal 
and sibling entrepreneurs. Organization Science, 29(2), 264-283. 
Blatt, R. (2009). Tough love: How communal schemas and contracting practices build relational 
capital in entrepreneurial teams. Academy of Management Review, 34(3), 533-551. 
Brass, D. J., Galaskiewicz, J., Greve, H. R., & Tsai, W. P. (2004). Taking stock of networks and 
organizations: A multilevel perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 47(6), 795-
817. 
Bruderl, J., & Preisendorfer, P. (1998). Network support and the success of newly founded 
businesses. Small Business Economics, 10(3), 213-225. 
Burt, R. S. (1992). Structural holes, The social structure of competition. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Campopiano, G., & Rondi, E. (2019, this issue). Hierarchical dyadic congruence in family firms: 
The interplay of supervisor and supervisee socioemotional wealth importance and familial 
status. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 
23 
 
Carney, M. (2005). Corporate governance and competitive advantage in family-controlled firms. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29(3), 249-265.   
Carney, M., Gedajlovic, E., & Strike, V. M. (2014). Dead money: Inheritance law and the 
longevity of family firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 38(6), 1261-1283. 
Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., Pearson, A. W., & Barnett, T. (2012). Family involvement, family 
influence, and family-centered non-economic goals in small firms. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, 36(2), 267-293. 
Chrisman, J. J., Devaraj, S., & Patel, P. C. (2017). The impact of incentive compensation on labor 
productivity in family and nonfamily firms. Family Business Review, 30(2), 119-136. 
Chrisman, J. J., Memili, E., & Misra, K. (2014). Nonfamily managers, family firms, and the 
winner's curse: The influence of noneconomic goals and bounded rationality. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 38(5), 1103-1127. 
Chrisman, J. J., & Patel, P. C. (2012). Variations in R&D investments of family and nonfamily 
firms: Behavioral agency and myopic loss aversion perspectives. Academy of 
Management Journal, 55(4), 976-997. 
Chrisman, J.J., Sharma, P., Steier, L.P. & Chua, J.H. (2013). The influence of family goals, 
governance, and resources on firm outcomes. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
37(6), 1249-1261. 
Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J., & Bergiel, E. B. (2009). An agency theoretic analysis of the 
professionalized family-owned firm. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33, 355-372. 
Chua, J.H., Chrisman, J.J., Kellermanns, F.W., & Wu, Z. (2011). Family involvement and new 
venture debt financing. Journal of Business Venturing, 26(4), 472-488. 
Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J., & Sharma, P. (1999). Defining the family business by behavior. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 23(4), 19-39. 
Criaco, G., Sieger, P., Wennberg, K., Chirico, F., & Minola, T. (2017). Parents’ performance in 
entrepreneurship as a “double-edged sword” for the intergenerational transmission of 
entrepreneurship. Small Business Economics, 49(4), 841-864. 
Cruz, C., Garces-Galdeano, L., Justo, R., & Larraza-Kintana, M. (2019, this issue. When do 
women make a better table? Examining the influence of women directors on family firms’ 
corporate social responsibility. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 
Dacin, M. T., Beal, B. D., & Ventresca, M. J. (1999). The embeddedness of organizations: 
Dialogue and directions. Journal of Management, 25(3), 317-356. 
Davidsson, P., Achtenhagen, L., & Naldi, L. (2010). Small firm growth. Foundations and Trends 
in Entrepreneurship, 6(2), 69-166. 
De Massis, A., Kotlar, J., Chua, J. H., & Chrisman, J. J. (2014). Ability and willingness as 
sufficiency conditions for family-oriented particularistic behavior: Implications for theory 
and empirical studies. Journal of Small Business Management, 52(2), 344-364. 
Eddleston, K. A., & Kellermanns, F. W. (2007). Destructive and productive family relationships: 
A stewardship theory perspective. Journal of Business Venturing, 22(4), 545-565. 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Schoonhoven, C. B. (1990). Organizational growth: Linking founding team, 
strategy, environment, and growth among U.S. semiconductor ventures, 1978-1988. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(3), 504-530. 
Elder, G. H., Johnson, M. K., & Crosnoe, R. (2003). The emergence and development of life 
course theory, In Shanahan, M.J., Mortimer, J.T., & Kirkpatrick Johnson, M. (Eds.) 
Handbook of the life course (pp. 3-19). Boston, MA: Springer:. 
24 
 
Ellul, A., Pagano, M., & Panunzi, F. (2010). Inheritance law and investment in family firms. 
American Economic Review, 100(5), 2414-2450. 
Fang, H., Siau, K. L., Memili, E., & Dou, J. (2019, this issue). Cognitive antecedents of family 
business bias in investment decisions. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 
Gagné, M., Sharma, P., & De Massis, A. (2014). The study of organizational behaviour in family 
business. European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 23(5), 643-656. 
Garcia, P., Sharma, P., De Massis, A., Wright, M., & Scholes, L. (2019, this issue). Perceived 
parental behaviors and next generation engagement in family firms: a social cognitive 
perspective. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 
Gedajlovic, E. R., & Carney, M. (2010). Markets, hierachies and families: Toward a transaction 
cost theory of the family firm. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(6),1145-1171. 
Gersick, K. E., Lansberg, I., Desjardins, M., & Dunn, B. (1999). Stages and transitions: 
Managing change in the family business. Family Business Review, 12(4), 287-297. 
Glisson, C., & James, L. R. (2002). The cross-level effects of culture and climate in human 
service teams. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 23(6), 767-794. 
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Haynes, K. T., Nunez-Nickel, M., Jacobson, K. J. L., & Moyano-Fuentes, J. 
(2007). Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence 
from Spanish olive oil mills. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52(1), 106-137. 
Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78(6), 
1360-1380. 
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. 
American Journal of Sociology, 91(3), 481-510. 
Howard-Grenville, J., & Rerup, C. (2016). A process perspective on organizational routines. In 
Langley, A. & Tsoukas, H. (Eds.) The SAGE handbook of organization process studies 
(pp. 323-337). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Hsueh, J. W.-J., & Gomez-Solorzano, M. (2019, this issue). Social tie heterogeneity and firms’ 
networking strategy. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 
Jack, S. L., & Anderson, A. R. (2002). The effects of embeddedness on the entrepreneurial 
process. Journal of Business Venturing, 17(5), 467-487. 
Jaskiewicz, P., Combs, J. G., Shanine, K. K., & Kacmar, K. M. (2017). Introducing the family: A 
review of family science with implications for management research. Academy of 
Management Annals, 11(1), 309-341. 
Jennings, J. E., Eddleston, K. A., Jennings, P. D., & Sarathy, R. (2015). Firms within families: 
Enterprising in diverse country contexts. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica, 47(2), 263-291. 
Kellermanns, F. W., Eddleston, K. A., & Zellweger, T. M. (2012). Extending the socioemotional 
wealth perspective: A look at the dark side. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 36(6), 
1175-1182. 
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. (2000). Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An analysis 
of diversified Indian business groups. Journal of Finance, 55, 867–891. 
Khavul, S., Bruton, G. D., & Wood, E. (2009). Informal family business in Africa. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(6), 1219-1238. 
25 
 
Kotlar, J., & Sieger, P. (2019, this issue). Bounded rationality and bounded reliability: A study of 
non-family managers’ entrepreneurial behavior in family firms. Entrepreneurship Theory 
and Practice. 
Le Breton-Miller, I., & Miller, D. (2018). Looking back at and forward from:“Family governance 
and firm performance: Agency, stewardship, and capabilities”. Family Business Review, 
31(2), 229-237. 
Le Breton-Miller, I., Miller, D., & Lester, R. H. (2011). Stewardship or agency? A social 
embeddedness reconciliation of conduct and performance in public family businesses. 
Organization Science, 22(3), 704-721. 
Leana, C. R., & Van Buren, H. J. (1999). Organizational social capital and employment practices. 
Academy of Management Review, 24, 538-555. 
Lude, M., & Prügl, R. (2019, this issue). Risky decisions and the family firm bias: An 
experimental study based on prospect theory. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 
Luo, X. R., & Chung, C.-N. (2013). Filling or abusing the institutional void? Ownership and 
management control of public family businesses in an emerging market. Organization 
Science, 24(2), 591-613. 
Luoma-aho, V. (2013). Corporate reputation and the theory of social capital. In Carroll, C.C. 
(Ed.), The handbook of communication and corporate reputation (pp. 279–290). Hoboken: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Mani, D., & Durand, R. (2019, this issue). Family firms in the ownership network: Clustering, 
bridging and embeddedness. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 
Martinez-Jimenez, R. (2009). Research on women in family firms: Current status and future 
directions. Family Business Review, 22(1), 53-64. 
McLarty, B. D., Vardaman, J. M., & Barnett, T. (2019, this issue). Congruence in exchange: The 
influence of supervisors on employee performance in family firms. . Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice. 
McMullen, J. S., & Warnick, B. J. (2015). To nurture or groom? The parent-founder succession 
dilemma. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 39(6), 1379-1412. 
Mehrotra, V., Morck, R., Shim, J., & Wiwattanakantang, Y. (2013). Adoptive expectations: 
Rising sons in Japanese family firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 108(3), 840-854. 
Moran, P. (2005). Structural vs. relational embeddedness: Social capital and managerial 
performance. Strategic Management Journal, 26(12), 1129-1151. 
Morck, R., & Yeung, B. (2003). Agency problems in large family business groups. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 27(4), 367-382. 
Nahapiet, J., & Ghoshal, S. (1998). Social capital, intellectual capital, and the organizational 
advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23, 242-266. 
Neckebrouck, J., Schulze, W., & Zellweger, T. (2018). Are family firms good employers? 
Academy of Management Journal, 61(2), 553-585. 
Parker, S. C. (2016). Family firms and the “willing successor” problem. Entrepreneurship Theory 
and Practice, 40(6), 1241-1259. 
Parsons, T. (1949). The social structure of the family. In R. N. Anshen, The family: its function 
and destiny (pp. 173-201). Oxford, UK: Harper. 
Pearson, A. W., Carr, J. C., & Shaw, J. C. (2008). Toward a theory of familiness: A social capital 
perspective. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 32(6), 949-969. 
Penrose, E. T. (1959). The theory of the growth of the firm. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. 
26 
 
Peredo, A. M., & Chrisman, J. J. (2006). Toward a theory of community-based enterprise. 
Academy of Management Review, 31(2), 309-328. 
Perez-Gonzalez, F. (2006). Inherited control and firm performance. American Economic Review, 
96(5), 1559-1588. 
Pieper, T. M., Smith, A. D., Kudlats, J., & Astrachan, J. H. (2015). The persistence of 
multifamily firms: Founder imprinting, simple rules, and monitoring processes. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 39(6), 1313-1337. 
Portes, A., & Sensenbrenner, J. (1993). Embeddedness and immigration: Notes on the social 
determinants of economic action. American Journal of Sociology, 98(6), 1320-1350. 
Reay, T. (2019, this issue). Family routines and next-generation engagement in family firms. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 
Rodríguez-Ariza, L., Cuadrado-Ballesteros, B., Martínez-Ferrero, J., & García-Sánchez, I. M. 
(2017). The role of female directors in promoting CSR practices: An international 
comparison between family and non-family businesses. Business Ethics: A European 
Review, 26(2), 162-174. 
Rousseau, D. M. (1985). Issues of level in organizational research: Multi-level and cross-level 
perspectives. Research in Organizational Behavior, 7(1), 1-37. 
Ruef, M. (2002). Strong ties, weak ties and islands: structural and cultural predictors of 
organizational innovation. Industrial and Corporate Change, 11(3), 427-449. 
Ruef, M. (2010). The entrepreneurial group: Social identities, relations, and collective action: 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., Dino, R. N., & Buchholtz, A. K. (2001). Agency relationships 
in family firms: Theory and evidence. Organization Science, 12(2), 99-116. 
Sharma, P. 2008). Familiness: capital stocks and flows between family and business. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 32(6), 971-977. 
Sharma, P., & Irving, P. G. (2005). Four bases of family business successor commitment: 
Antecedents and consequences. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29(1), 13-33. 
Sieger, P., & Minola, T. (2017). The family's financial support as a “poisoned gift”: A family 
embeddedness perspective on entrepreneurial intentions. Journal of Small Business 
Management, 55, 179-204. 
Smith, G. D. (2009). East Africa: Extended families with many rights. Entrepreneurship Theory 
and Practice, 33(6), 1239-1244. 
Soleimanof, S., Singh, K., & Holt, D. T. (2019, this issue). Micro-foundations of corporate 
entrepreneurship in family firms: An institution-based perspective. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice. 
Sorenson, O., & Stuart, T. E. (2001). Syndication networks and the spatial distribution of venture 
capital investments. American Journal of Sociology, 106(6), 1546-1588. 
Stam, W., & Elfring, T. (2008). Entrepreneurial orientation and new venture performance: The 
moderating role of intra- and extraindustry social capital. Academy of Management 
Journal, 51(1), 97-111. 
Steier, L.P. (2007). New venture creation and organization: A familial sub-narrative. Journal of 
Business Research, 60(10), 1099-1107. 
Steier, L. P. (2009). Familial capitalism in global institutional contexts: Implications for corporate 




Steier, L. P., Chrisman, J. J., & Chua, J. H. (2015). Governance challenges in family businesses 
and business families. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 39(6), 1265-1280. 
Steier, L. P., Chua, J. H., & Chrisman, J. J. (2009). Embeddedness perspectives of economic 
action within family firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(6), 1157-1167. 
Stuart, T. E. (2000). Interorganizational alliances and the performance of firms: a study of growth 
and innovation rates in a high-technology industry. Strategic Management Journal, 21(8), 
791-811. 
Takeuchi, R., Chen, G., & Lepak, D. P. (2009). Through the looking glass of a social system: 
cross-level effects of high-performance work systems on employees' attitudes. Personnel 
Psychology, 62(1), 1-29. 
Tsai, W., & Ghoshal, S. (1998). Social capital and value creation: The role of intrafirm networks. 
Academy of Management Journal, 41, 464-478. 
Turner, S., & Lapan, R. T. (2002). Career self-efficacy and perceptions of parent support in 
adolescent career development. The Career Development Quarterly, 51(1), 44-55. 
Uzzi, B. (1997). Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: The paradox of 
embeddedness. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42, 35–67. 
Van de Ven, A. H., & Poole, M. S. (1995). Explaining development and change in organizations. 
Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 510-540. 
Verbeke, A., & Greidanus, N.S. (2009). The end of the opportunism vs trust debate: Bounded 
reliability as a new envelope concept in research on MNE governance. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 40(9), 1471-1495. 
Verbeke, A., & Kano, L. (2012). The transaction cost economics theory of the family firm: 
Family-based human asset specificity and the bifurcation bias. Entrepreneurship Theory 
and Practice, 36(6), 1183-1205. 
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press. 
Zellweger, T. (2017). Managing the family business: Theory and practice. Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar. 
Zellweger, T., Richards, M., Sieger, P., & Patel, P. C. (2016). How much am I expected to pay 
for my parents’ firm? An institutional logics perspective on family discounts. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 40(5), 1041-1069. 
Zellweger, T. M., Kellermanns, F. W., Chrisman, J. J., & Chua, J. H. (2012). Family control and 
family firm valuation by family CEOs: The importance of intentions for transgenerational 
control. Organization Science, 23(3), 851-868. 
Zellweger, T. M., Nason, R. S., Nordqvist, M., & Brush, C. G. (2013). Why do family firms 
strive for nonfinancial goals? An organizational identity perspective. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, 37(2), 229-248. 
Zhang, Z., Wang, M., & Shi, J. (2012). Leader-follower congruence in proactive personality and 
work outcomes: The mediating role of leader-member exchange. Academy of 






Thomas M. Zellweger holds the Chair of Family Business at the University of St. Gallen in 
Switzerland. He is the academic director of the Global Center for Entrepreneurship and 
Innovation and the director of the Swiss Research Institute of Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship at the University of St. Gallen. He is an Editor of Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice. 
 
James J. Chrisman is the Julia Bennett Rouse Professor of Management, Head of the 
Department of Management and Information Systems, and Director of the Center of Family 
Enterprise Research at Mississippi State University. He also holds a joint appointment as Senior 
Research Fellow with the Centre for Entrepreneurship and Family Enterprise at the University of 
Alberta, School of Business and is a Senior Editor of Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 
 
Jess H. Chua is Emeritus Professor of Finance and Family Business Governance at the Haskayne 
School of Business of the University of Calgary, Professor of Family Business at the Lancaster 
University Management School of the University of Lancaster, and Qiu Shi Chair Professor of 
Family Business at the School of Management of Zhejiang University. 
 
Lloyd P. Steier is Professor in the Department of Strategic Management and Organization at the 
School of Business, University of Alberta. He is also Vice-Dean, holds a Distinguished Chair in 
Entrepreneurship and Family Enterprise, and is the Academic Director for the Centre for 
Entrepreneurship and Family Enterprise. 
 
 
The guest editors acknowledge the Swiss Research Institute of Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship and Center for Family Business at St. Gallen University, the Centre for 
Entrepreneurship and Family Enterprise at the University of Alberta, the Center of Family 
Enterprise Research at Mississippi State University, and an anonymous donor for providing 
financial support for the conference where the articles and commentaries contained in this special 
issue were originally presented. We also thank Marlies Graemiger of the University of St. Gallen 
for her assistance in managing the local arrangements. 
